Traffic Stops and Probable Cause

On November 20 I had the honor to participate in the 2009 OVI Update seminar presented by the Ohio State Bar Association. One of the participants in the seminar was the Honorable Jennifer Weiler, Judge of The Garfield Heights, Ohio Municipal Court and co-author of “Ohio Driving Under the Influence Law,” a publication of Thompson-West Publishing. Judge Weiler’s topic was “Motions to Suppress in Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence Cases.” This blog is a discussion of the judge’s excellent presentation regarding traffic stops and their constitutionality.

There are two types of traffic stops and different constitutional standards apply to each. These traffic stops are characterized as the “non-investigatory” traffic stop and the other the “investigatory” traffic stop.

Non-Investigatory Traffic Stop

The most common stop is the non-investigatory traffic stop. It occurs when an officer observes a violation of the traffic code. Upon observing the violation, the officer stops the driver to issue a citation.

This type of stop requires probable cause, that is, a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, which is provided when the officer witnesses the traffic violation, State v. Downs, 2004 Ohio 3003, State v. Moeller, 2000 WL 1577287. De minimus violations can form a sufficient basis for this type of stop owing to the fact that the officer personally observed the violation.

This does not mean that the stop can be pretextual - an alleged violation for the purpose of stopping the driver when no actual violation occurred, ie. Low tire pressure, spider crack in the windshield, gas tank cap open. But, as long as a legitimate basis for the stop exists, the subjective intent or motivation of the officer does not invalidate the stop, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806. The stop can be pre-textual as long as there is some violation that the officer observes or believes he observes.

Investigatory Traffic Stop

The second type of traffic stop is an investigatory traffic stop. It has been referred to as “the motorized equivalent of a Terry Stop,” State v. Downs, 2004 Ohio 3003. This stop permits the officer to stop the vehicle is the officer has reasonable suspicion based on specific, articuable facts than an offense has been or is being committed, State v. Slider, 2008 Ohio 2318., State v. Downs, Supra.

In this type of stop the officer does not necessarily see a specific violation but does have sufficient reason to believe a criminal act has occurred or is occurring and the officer seeks to confirm or refute his or her suspicion, State v. Moeller, Supra. Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than that of reasonable cause required to make an arrest.

This type of stop is predicated upon informant’s tips, 911 calls, or random plate checks. The reader is directed to prior blogs regarding the discussion of informant’s tips as a basis for a traffic stop.

In summary, where the officer personally observes a traffic violation (a non-investigatory stop), he may stop the vehicle. Where the officer does not personally observe the traffic violation (an investigatory stop), the officer must point to specific articuable facts that an offense has occurred or is occurring.

What is the Court’s Discretion in Sentencing in OVI Cases?

Historically, courts have normally sentenced defendants to the minimum sentence upon conviction or plea to an OVI, i.e. three days for a first time offender, ten days to a second offense, and so on, depending upon the number of prior convictions within a six year period. With the enactment of the “look-back rule” and the recent Hoover decision, more and more defendants are looking at sentences exceeding the minimum.

A recent case from Clermont County is typical of this trend. The case, State v. Elliott, 2009 Ohio 5926, involved a multiple offender. Since the defendant had refused the breathalyzer, the look back rule was imposed and it was found that this offender had been convicted more that 5 times for OVI. In fact, he had 15 convictions in his lifetime. The court sentenced the defendant to the maximum 30 months in jail. Additionally, because the defendant was on community control sanctions at the time of his arrest, the judge sentenced the defendant to an additional 12 months in jail to run consecutively with his sentence on the OVI. In total, the defendant was given 42 months in jail (3½ years).

The defendant appealed his sentence claiming the court abused it discretion in imposing such a draconian sentence. He appealed on two grounds. First, he claimed the sentence imposed was not supported by the record and is contrary to law. Second, he claimed the sentence imposed was excessive and failed to achieve the overriding purposes of felony sentencing.

The court disposed of the first issue by stating “Trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences," State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006 Ohio 856, P100, 845 N.E.2d 470. In applying Foster appellate courts must apply a two-step approach. First, they must examine the sentencing court's compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court's decision shall be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard," State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008 Ohio 4912, P4, 896 N.E.2d 124.

The court went on to say, “A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, where the trial court consider[s] the purposes [of the sentencing guidelines], ...properly applie[s] post-release control, and ... sentence[s] [appellant]...within the permissible range." In addition, so long as the trial court gives "careful and substantial deliberation to the relevant statutory considerations" the court's sentencing decision is not an abuse of discretion.

The appellate court found that the judge, on the record. had reviewed the sentencing guidelines, balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in the guidelines, and as, required, informed the appellant he could be subjected to three years of post release controls.

The court addressed the appellant second claim by reviewing the appellant’s record. The record clearly showed that the appellant had 15 prior convictions for OVI, the he was ordered into treatment that failed, and that the defendant’s license had been suspended several times but he continued to drive.

Therefore, the court concluded that the judge did comply with the law by applying the sentencing guidelines set forth in the Ohio Revised Code. Further, addressing the second prong of the sentencing review, found that the lower court did not violate the abuse-of-discretion standard.

As a result, in applying this court’s opinion, a court’s sentence will not be overturned if the record on appeal shows:

1. That the court balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in the statute.

2. Told the defendant of the possibility of post relief control (if applicable), and

3. The record of the defendant justified the sentence being imposed (abuse- of-discretion standard).

The Observations of the Informant Must be Placed on the Record to Justify a Stop

If you’ve been a reader of this blog, I’ve discussed the justification for a traffic stop based upon the observations of an informant. A recent Third Appellant District Court case further defines the information necessary to justify the stop.

In this case, State v. Fields, 2009 Ohio 5909, an informant called police dispatch to inform them of a suspected drunk driver. The defendant filed a motion to suppress claiming the police officer had insufficient cause to stop the Defendant. At the motion hearing, the state called the informant who testified as follows:

Q Did you have an opportunity to make a 911 call on November 28th, 2008, around 6 o'clock in the event?

A Yes.

Q And where were you at when you made that call?

A I was heading south on South Sandusky.

Q And is that in the City of Upper Sandusky?

A Yes. Hm-hmm.

Q Wyandot County, Ohio?

A Yeah.

Q Could you describe what you observed?

At no time did the informant testify as to his personal observations of the defendant at the time of the incident. In addition, the officer’s testimony failed to illustrate that he or the dispatcher were aware of the details of the informant’s personal observations.

In its analysis, the court cited State v. Bailey, 2008 Ohio 2254. In that case the arresting officer testified that he had received a dispatch that another police department had received a call of a "possible drunk driver" and that one of the officers at the other department had witnessed the same vehicle speeding. The arresting officer located the vehicle and pulled it over after observing the vehicle's failure to signal. Neither the other police officer who had observed the vehicle's speeding nor the dispatcher who had received the citizen's phone call testified at the hearing. In addition, the citizen informant who had made the original call to the other police department testified extensively to his personal observations of the defendant's erratic driving. However, there was no testimony demonstrating what, if any, information the eyewitness had relayed to the other police department's dispatcher concerning the defendant's erratic behavior. Since the State had failed to demonstrate that the law-enforcement community as a whole possessed facts constituting probable cause to arrest.

In its conclusion, the court stated, “there is an absence of evidence demonstrating that someone in the law enforcement community knew specific facts that would support reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The State failed to demonstrate that [the informant’s] personal observations were relayed to the dispatcher, thereby allowing [the arresting officer] to solely rely on the dispatch to justify his investigative stop of [the informant]. Furthermore, [the officer’s] testimony, considered alone, fails to demonstrate reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. While we acknowledge that there is evidence that a law enforcement officer...eventually talked to [the informant] at the scene, this did not occur until after [the arresting officer] had already approached Fields to make the detention and investigation.

Therefore, this court held that the state must place the following on the record in support of a stop based upon the observations of an informant:

1. The observations of the informant, and

2. That these observations were communicated to the arresting officer, and

3. The observations will support reasonable, articuable suspicion of criminal activity..

For evidentiary purposes, the court will not allow the trier of fact to draw an inference based solely on conclusary statements of a dispatcher. To do otherwise would permit the trier of fact to draw and inference on an inference which would violate the Rules of Evidence.

Parental Liability

A recent Lorain County case discussed a pertinent issue relative to OVI. That issue, in the case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jaeger, 2009 Ohio 5756, concerned parental liability for the acts of their child. The case arose from the actions of a 15 year old who became intoxicated and crashed into another’s property damaging a garage and a fence. Allstate insurance paid the claim of its insured and then sued the parents of the minor. The theory of liability was two-fold: (1) O.R.C. 3109.09(B), the parental liability statue and (2) common law negligent supervision.

O.R.C. 3109.09(B) - Parental Liability Statute

The statute's language is as follows: "[a]ny owner of property . . . may maintain a civil action to recover compensatory damages not exceeding ten thousand dollars and court costs from the parent of a minor if the minor willfully damages property belonging to the owner or commits acts cognizable as a 'theft offense...involving the property of the owner.” Therefore, there are two independent grounds for liability:

1. A child’s wilful damage to property, or

2. A child’s cognizable act of theft involving property of the owner.

In order for a parent to be liable in the first instance, it must be shown that the child intentionally caused the damage to the property. The Supreme Court of Ohio distinguished between "wanton negligence" and a "willful tort" that "involves the element of intent or purpose," A parent may not be held liable under the willful acts provision of Section 3109.09 for damage caused by joyriding in a stolen car unless the child also intentionally caused the subsequent damage, Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 266, 383 N.E.2d 880. Thus, the court distinguished between a negligent act and an intentional one. Based upon that dicta, the court determined the act of the child had to be intentional not merely negligent. Therefore, in order to prevail the plaintiff must prove that the child intended to damage property before parental liability will attach. Since Allstate could not prove that the child intentionally damaged the property, liability did not attach.

In the second instance parental liability arises under the 'theft provision' of R.C. 3109.09 when the child has engaged in conduct which is the equivalent of theft and the property thereafter is damaged, regardless of whether the child acted in a willful manner at the time the property was damaged, Conover v. McCutcheon, 9th Dist. No. 1832, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1329, 1990 WL 40163. Therefore, if the act of the child amounts to a “theft” as defined by law, the parent can be held liable in the event of damages caused as a result of that “theft” whether or not the child acted wilfully.

While it is not pertinent to this discussion, I point out that the court denied liability under the second ground because although the child did “steal” the car, Allstate was not the owner of the damaged property as required by the statute.

Negligent Supervision

Although at common law a parent is not ordinarily liable for damages caused by his child's wrongful conduct, "liability can attach when the injury committed by the child is the foreseeable consequence of a parent's negligent act," Huston v. Konieczny, 52 Ohio St. 3d 214, 217, 556 N.E.2d 505 (1990). The Ohio Supreme Court has outlined three ways that parents may incur liability: (1) negligent entrustment; (2) negligent supervision, and (3) consenting to or directing the child's wrongful conduct.

The relevant element in any negligence theory is that of foreseeablility. In the case of parental liability, could the parent foresee the actions of their child? In the Allstate case, the court pointed to the fact that “...[the parent] pointed to evidence tending to show that she did not know of any prior instance wherein her son had acted in a similar manner, endangering others or their property by using a car. She also pointed to evidence that she had supervised her son to the extent that she had spoken with him on the evening of the incident and she detected no cause for concern that he might ‘do anything that would be dangerous to himself or to others.’”

The court concluded that “...reasonable minds could only conclude that [the parent] did not know, nor should she have known, that injury to another was a probable consequence of her son's behavior. Therefore, the court denied liability under this theory of liability.

While the subject matter of this blog is the theory of "Parental Liability," it is important to note the potential consequence to a parent who knowingly allows their child to operate a vehicle knowing or having reason to believe the child is under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both, or might potentially be under the influence (prom, school dance, fraternity/sorority party, etc.).